The quote, below is from a review of the book, Being in Pain by Abraham Olivier. The review is by Vince Luizzi in the Nov/Dec 2008 issue of Philosophy Now. Though it is about pain, presumably it could apply to all forms of ‘bodily perception,’ including pleasure.
In introducing Merleau-Ponty’s view, Olivier writes, “Je suis mon corps — I am my body. Thus Merleau-Ponty coins his well-known viewpoint that the body is not simply an object among objects, but instead refers to myself as perceiving subject. ” (p9.) How do we speak of pain on this view? Olivier tells us pain is “disturbed bodily perception bound to hurt, affliction, or agony… [I]f I speak of the ‘body in pain’, I refer to the way pain disturbs the way I qua body perceive, that is sense, feel, and cognize.” (p51.) So pain is a disturbed perception of the body. If so, we might think of further disturbances of our perception which would eliminate pain, or engage our minds in such a fashion that pain subsides. According to Olivier, “If pain is itself essentially part of my perception, and my point of view changes, the quality of the pain must also change … What I advocate is an insight into our bodily capacity to change our body’s pain by means of a change of perception.” (p166.) We can talk about pain, write about it, or write or speak to it. Or we can imagine situations that preoccupy us, disrupting the disruption of pain, thus diminishing the pain.
This raises some interesting questions about the morality of inflicting a “disturbed bodily perception” (pain) on others. If those others don’t perceive that “disturbance” as pain, then is it pain?
-Julie
Coloring 