[If you are new to my blog, this is the latest installment in an on-again-off-again discussion between myself, Dr. C, and Felix Grant on whether or not we have free will. We are, none of us, trained philosophers; it's done in good fun, and should not be taken too seriously.]
The last few sentences of a review of the book, Libertarian Accounts of Free Will, by Randolph Clarke; reviewed by Erik Carlsson in Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews are:
… Finally, we may note a further problem that any agent-causal account faces, even if the possibility of agent-causation is granted. For an appeal to such causation to be of any help in solving the problem of active control, we must assume that although agents can be causes, they cannot be effects. If an agent is an effect, i.e., a caused substance, it seems that she cannot be an originator of her action, in the strong sense required by agent-causal libertarians.
I think that’s the problem many people run into when thinking about whether or not we have free will, and I think it’s probably wrong.
I agree that (obviously, necessarily) “an agent is an effect,” — in other words, a person is biologically caused — but I think those are only our (necessary) starting coördinates.
If you believe in the existence of axioms — universal, persistent, and necessary — and that logical truths can be reached by logical reasoning, and if you are capable of abstract (generic) self-modeling and if you are then (only after the model has been formed without reference to ones particular, immediate self) able to make that abstract model your own desired self-image — then, to the extent that you follow that model in general and in specific events, you are exercising free will.
The model is not “pure,” the reasoning behind it is not “pure,” and ones pursuit of it is never “pure” but I don’t think that invalidates its origins and effect.
I don’t think this sort of self-modeling-to-a-target requires knowledge of philosophy or mathematics or science; I think it can come from something as simple and naïve as admiration and I think we show ubiquitous evidence of our constant self-modeling via the metaphors that are found everywhere in our language. I think we are able and instinctively willing (which willingness, I will grant, is certainly of biological origin) to do this sort of abstract, idealized self-modeling.
The book review, briefly referenced above, has an excellent overview of the libertarian position(s) on free will (they believe that free will is not compatible with determinism). Highly recommended if you are interested and not familiar with their arguments. [ link ]
-Julie
